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Religious Law and Secular Law in Democracy: 
The Evolutions of the Roman Catholic Doctrine 
After the Second Vatican Council 
Louis-Léon Christians ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A recurring jurisprudential conflict in modern law is the extent to 
which religious communities may appropriately seek to have their 
own religious norms incorporated into secular law. In the Muslim 
world, that issue takes on life and death significance.1 Conflict arises 
when the question goes beyond asking whether Islamic law should 
be incorporated into secular law and asks whether secular law in 
general should be required to be consistent with, and subordinate to, 
Islamic law.2 Similar questions arise in Western nations regarding the 
extent to which secular norms may parallel or incorporate religious 
norms. Examples include Sunday closing laws,3 laws exempting Jews 
and Muslims from otherwise applicable animal slaughter regulations,4 
and, more controversially, laws criminalizing conduct that violates 
what some would consider religious mandates, such as laws 
concerning abortion5 or homosexual conduct.6 
 
 ∗ Professor, Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. The author 
wishes to thank Cole Durham, Brigham Young University Law School Professor, for discussing 
this paper with him and the members of the Brigham Young University Law Review Board for 
their invaluable editorial work, including their improvements on the English in this paper. 
 1. See generally Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the 
Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of 
Predominantly Muslim Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947 (2005). 
 2. See, e.g., IRAQ CONST. art. 2; see also Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 
(2002). 
 3. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 4. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
 5. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that legislation banning 
the funding of abortions did not violate the Establishment Clause); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); German Constitutional Court Abortion Decision, BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975) 
(translated by Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby), http://swiss.csail.mit.edu/~rauch/nvp/ 
german/german_abortion_decision2.html. 
 6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. 
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This conflict is particularly difficult within the context of a 
pluralistic democracy, where it is problematic—if not altogether 
illegitimate—for one religious group to invoke coercive legal 
sanctions in support of its religious beliefs. On the other hand, it 
would be paradoxical if religious speakers were the only ones who 
were denied the right to use democratic processes to advocate 
adoption of their ideas.7 
Significantly, these conflicts may arise not only in the context of 
affirmatively legislating values that coincide with religious beliefs, but 
they may also arise as a result of affording protections to 
conscientiously held objections. To the extent that neither the State 
nor other citizens will be able to require conduct inconsistent with 
the beliefs protected, the religious beliefs in question would acquire 
not only legal protection but also status as legal imperatives. 
This Article analyzes the struggle for proper balance in the 
context of the Roman Catholic experience. During the Second 
Vatican Council, the Roman Catholic Church transformed itself 
from a vigorous defender of the ancien regime “into one of the 
world’s leading advocates of social and political justice, democratic 
governance, and human rights.”8 The new Catholic understanding of 
democratic liberalism is a complex story,9 and the critical test for 
discovering the meaning and scope of the Church’s new 
understanding lies in the extent to which it will allow religious norms 
to be incorporated into secular law. 
The aim of this Article is to discuss key Catholic 
pronouncements that address this fundamental issue and, from that 
vantage point, to contribute to the more general discussion 
regarding the appropriate relation of religion and law within the 
framework of democracy. More specifically, the aim is to address 
Catholic thought about democratic constraints in matters of 
 
Ct. H.R. 52 (1981); see also P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195; 
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988). 
 7. See the last evolutioning of Jorgen Habermas in his 2004 dialogue with Cardinal J. 
Ratzinger, “Moral foundation of democratic politics,” in Zur Debatte of the Catholic Academy 
of Bavière [hereinafter Ratzinger & Habermas], http://www.kath-akademie-bayern.de. 
 8. Zachary R. Calo, Catholic Social Thought, Political Liberalism, and the Idea of 
Human Rights 1, 1 (The Fourth Annual Lilly Fellows Program, Samford University, Nov. 11–
14, 2004), http://www.samford.edu/lillyhumanrights/papers/Calo_Catholic.pdf. 
 9. See generally Zachary R. Calo, “The Indispensable Basis of Democracy”: American 
Catholicism, the Church-State Debate, and the Soul of American Liberalism, 1920–1929, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 1037 (2005). 
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religious importance, which, for purposes of this Article, amounts to 
determining when religious-grounded norms may be democratically 
imposed. Thus, this Article will explore the internal conditions under 
which religious bodies such as the Roman Catholic Church may 
consider it legitimate to promote religious norms and values in a 
democratic-legal setting. 
To address the point, this Article compares two approaches. Part 
II discusses the Catholic Church’s evaluation of the scope of 
religious freedom under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,10 as 
viewed from the vantage point of the famous declaration Dignitatis 
Humanae, which was promulgated in 1965 during the Second 
Vatican Council.11 Part III provides a comparative exploration of a 
recent doctrinal statement that the Holy See Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith—chaired by then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger 
(now Pope Benedict XVI)—issued in November 2002.12 Part IV 
ultimately draws the conclusion that the Catholic notions of 
“religious norms” in these two approaches differ, and it will be 
necessary to find a way to reconcile them (or to choose between 
them) in order to provide clear guidance concerning the extent to 
which Catholic thought allows religious norms to be incorporated 
into secular legal systems. 
II. THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF THE SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM UNDER DIGNITATIS HUMANAE 
A starting point for reflection on these issues is a carefully 
considered declaration by Pope John Paul II issued as part of a 
speech on the World Day of Peace in 1991, which condemned 
certain forms of legal enforcement of religious laws: 
Extremely sensitive situations arise when a specifically religious 
norm becomes, or tends to become, the law of the State, without 
 
 10. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (enacted Sept. 3, 1953). 
 11. Council Vatican II, Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae § 2, 
Dec. 7, 1965 [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae], http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_ 
councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. 
 12. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on Some Questions 
Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political Life § 3, Nov. 24, 2002 [hereinafter 
Doctrinal Note], http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/ 
rc_con_cfaith_doc_ 20021124_politica_en.html. 
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due consideration for the distinction between the domains proper 
to religion and to political society. In practice, the identification of 
religious law with civil law can stifle religious freedom, even going 
so far as to restrict or deny other inalienable human rights.13 
The term “specifically religious norms” calls for further exploration. 
The phrase suggests that only specifically religious norms pose the 
risk of stifling religious freedom. But does it therefore follow that no 
“sensitive situations” will arise from the standpoint of religious 
freedom and other human rights where norms that are not 
“specifically religious” are involved? Would the Catholic Church find 
it acceptable if the State enforced various religious norms provided 
that they were not “specifically religious”? If so, how can such 
properly enforceable religious norms be identified? More particularly, 
how does Catholic thought assess what constitutes the appropriate 
constraints on invoking law in support of matters of religious 
importance? Stated differently, under what circumstances does the 
Roman Catholic Church believe it is legitimate to advance a religious 
norm or value within the context of democratic society? 
The possible answers emerge by contrasting the approach of 
Dignitatis Humanae with the approach from the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith’s more recent statement in 2002. The 
scope of religious norms that are “specifically religious” from the 
vantage point of the former can be seen by contrasting the Dignitatis 
Humanae view with a much narrower conception that has been 
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights. This narrower 
conception is evident in the European Court’s interpretation of the 
notion of “manifestation” of religion and its consequent narrowing 
both of freedom of religion and the range of norms that can serve as 
the basis for invoking that freedom. The approach of the European 
Court of Human Rights legitimates a relatively narrow scope of 
religiously motivated conscientious objections. In contrast, the 
Catholic Church has advocated for a much broader view of the 
permissible scope of such objections. 
 
 13. Pope John Paul II, Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the XXIV World 
Day of Peace, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/documents/ 
hf_jp-ii_mes_08121990_xxiv-world-day-for-peace_en.html. 
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A. A Narrower View: The European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly held that 
the European guarantee of religious freedom “does not protect every 
act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.”14 The idea is that 
“when actions of individuals do not actually express the belief 
concerned they cannot be considered to be as such protected by 
Article 9.1, even when they are motivated or influenced by it.”15 Thus, 
for example, the Court held that pacifists at an army base who 
circulated leaflets explaining optional ways in which members of the 
armed forces could refuse to perform their duties did not “manifest” 
religion because the activity was merely motivated by, and did not 
actually “express,” the pacifists’ beliefs.16 This interpretation of what 
counts as a “manifestation” of belief only affords protection to a 
relatively narrow range of religious norms, and suggests an unduly 
narrow conception of what might be intended by the phrase 
“specifically religious norms.” 
In contrast to the European Court’s approach, the Catholic 
Church, in Dignitatis Humanae, took an expansive view of the range 
of norms that are entitled to religious freedom protection and, 
therefore, may be legitimately protected and enforced. 
B. Dignitatis Humanae: A Broader Understanding  
of Religious Norms 
In a 1965 statement known as Dignitatis Humanae,17 the 
Second Vatican Council provided the Catholic position regarding 
the role of a State in imposing religious norms: 
[A] wrong is done when government imposes upon its people, by 
force or fear or other means, the profession or repudiation of any 
religion, or when it hinders men from joining or leaving a religious 
community. All the more is it a violation of the will of God and of 
the sacred rights of the person and the family of nations when force 
is brought to bear in any way in order to destroy or repress 
 
 14. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, ¶ 114 (2002); see 
also Kalaç v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1199, ¶ 27 (1997); Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 
19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5, ¶ 71 (1978). 
 15. Arrowsmith, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5, ¶ 71. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 11. 
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religion, either in the whole of mankind or in a particular country 
or in a definite community.18 
At first glance, the Pope may appear to be offering a classic, narrow 
definition of religious norms, but further reading reveals his decision 
to broaden the understanding of “religious matters.” The Pope 
affirmed that “the Christian faithful, in common with all other men, 
possess the civil right not to be hindered in leading their lives in 
accordance with their consciences.”19 He also explained: 
[T]he leaven of the Gospel has long been about its quiet work in 
the minds of men, and to it is due in great measure the fact that in 
the course of time men have come more widely to recognize their 
dignity as persons, and the conviction has grown stronger that the 
person in society is to be kept free from all manner of coercion in 
matters religious.20 
C. One Exception: The Public Order Understood as a Common Good in 
Conformity with the “Objective Moral Order” 
While Dignitatis Humanae appears to grant a broad 
understanding of “religious matters,” it maintains at least one limit 
to this very broad interpretation of religious freedom and freedom of 
conscience. Namely, the State has a positive obligation to defend 
itself against abuses in the name of religious freedom. In Dignitatis 
Humanae, the Second Vatican Council stated: 
[S]ociety has the right to defend itself against possible abuses 
committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special 
duty of government to provide this protection. However, 
government is not to act in an arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit 
of partisanship. Its action is to be controlled by juridical norms 
which are in conformity with the objective moral order. These 
norms arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights 
of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, 
also out of the need for an adequate care of public peace, which 
comes about when men live together in good order and in true 
 
 18. Id. § 6 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. § 13 (emphasis added). 
 20. Id. § 12. 
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justice, and finally out of the need for a proper guardianship of 
public morality.21 
Though several concepts in this statement may not be precisely 
defined, the right and duty of the Catholic Church regarding the 
political process remains clear.22 For instance, the notion of an 
“objective moral order” remains undefined beyond the clear 
statement that it must be compatible with the principle of equality. 
Furthermore, the potential role of religion in contributing to such a 
non-discriminatory definition of this “order,” which would be 
applicable to the whole legal system, remains unclear. However, as 
discussed throughout this paper, the Catholic Church and its 
members have the right and duty to shape through the political 
process the definition of “public morality” as used in the above 
section of Dignitatis Humanae.23 In doing so, the government must 
also “see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which is itself 
an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or 
covertly, for religious reasons.”24 
D. Dignitatis Humanae and Conscientious Objection 
Under this broader conception of religious norms as applied to 
the political process, Dignitatis Humanae seems to suggest that 
when the State’s policies come in direct contradiction with 
fundamental Christian principles, Catholics have an obligation to 
conscientiously object to participation in the application of such 
laws. Dignitatis Humanae teaches the following regarding situations 
when the laws of God and the laws of man come in conflict: 
As the Master, so too the Apostles recognized legitimate civil 
authority. “For there is no power except from God,” the Apostle 
 
 21. Id. § 7 (emphasis added). 
 22. See discussion infra Part III.D. The “common good” is understood in the 
Constitution Gaudium et Spes section 26 as “the sum of those conditions of social life which 
allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their 
own fulfillment.” Pope Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 
Gaudium et Spes, Dec. 7, 1965 [hereinafter Gaudium et Spes], available at http:// 
www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_ 
gaudium-et-spes_en.html; see also Dana L. Dillon, Public Order, the Common Good, and Our 
Supernatural Destiny (The Fourth Annual Lilly Fellows Program, Samford University, Nov. 
11–14, 2004), http://www.samford.edu/lillyhumanrights/papers/Dillon_Public.pdf. 
 23. See supra notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text. 
 24. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 11, § 6 (emphasis added). 
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teaches, and thereafter commands: “Let everyone be subject to 
higher authorities. . . . He who resists authority resists God’s 
ordinance” (Romans 13:1–5). At the same time, however, they did 
not hesitate to speak out against governing powers which set 
themselves in opposition to the holy will of God: “It is necessary to 
obey God rather than men” (Acts 5:29). This is the way along 
which the martyrs and other faithful have walked through all ages 
and over all the earth.25 
Thus, when the laws of man directly contradict the laws of God, the 
Catholic understanding recognizes a Christian’s obligation to choose 
God’s law. 
The implications of this obligation are unclear from the 
standpoint of an individual’s professional, civic, and political duties, 
but the Catholic Church has offered some guidance. First, a broad 
interpretation of an individual’s right to conscientiously object might 
concede that individuals who are obliged, at times, to materially 
participate in evil are not morally guilty. Pope John Paul II 
recognized this possibility when he spoke of the proper role judges 
and attorneys play in fulfilling their legal duties during a divorce 
proceeding: 
 [P]rofessionals in the field of civil law should avoid being 
personally involved in anything that might imply a cooperation with 
divorce. For judges this may prove difficult, since the legal order 
does not recognize a conscientious objection to exempt them from 
giving sentence. 
 For grave and proportionate motives they may therefore act in 
accord with the traditional principles of material cooperation. But 
they too must seek effective means to encourage marital unions, 
especially through a wisely handled work of reconciliation. 
 Lawyers, as independent professionals, should always decline the 
use of their profession for an end that is contrary to justice, as is 
divorce. They can only cooperate in this kind of activity when, in 
the intention of the client, it is not directed to the break-up of the 
marriage, but to the securing of other legitimate effects that can only 
be obtained through such a judicial process in the established legal 
order (cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 2383). In this way, 
with their work of assisting and reconciling persons who are going 
 
 25. Id. § 7 (footnotes omitted). 
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through a marital crisis, lawyers truly serve the rights of the person 
and avoid becoming mere technicians at the service of any interest 
whatever.26 
Another question involving individual conscientious objection 
arises when such objection interferes with the freedom and 
autonomy of others. To what extent may religious actors take or 
refuse to take legally mandatory actions when such decisions involve 
the interests and rights of others? Although conscientious objectors 
should enjoy autonomy in their individual choices, the law should 
not permit such objectors to use their individual function in a 
monopolistic way to impose their position on others. It is one thing 
to object for oneself; it is quite another thing to object in a manner 
that paralyzes the rights of others. 
The European Court of Human Rights faced this conflict in the 
recent decision of Pichon v. France.27 The Court faced the demand of 
“the owners of a pharmacy, who submitted that their religious beliefs 
justified their refusal to sell contraceptive pills in their dispensary.”28 
The Court held that the pharmacists could not “give precedence to 
their religious beliefs and impose them on others as justification for 
their refusal to sell such products.”29 This is clearly an area in which 
the Catholic Church recognizes a broader right to conscientious 
objection than the European Court. For the Church, the right of 
individual objection is to be broadly construed, and relates not only 
to “specifically religious matters” but to all legal norms that prevent 
believers from leading their personal lives in accordance with 
conscience. 
Accordingly, a debate arises as to the extent to which a religious 
organization such as the Catholic Church may appropriately 
advocate conscientious objection to State law. While the Catholic 
Church holds that people should be able to follow the dictates of 
 
 26. Pope John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the Prelate Auditors, Officials and 
Advocates of the Tribunal of the Roman Rota (Jan. 28, 2002), http://www.vatican.va/holy_ 
father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2002/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20020128_roman-rota 
_en.html. 
 27. 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. It is unfortunate that after enunciating that conscientious objection is not 
acceptable when it facilitates an abuse of a generally held societal position, the Court abstained 
from verifying in concreto whether the objections of these Catholic pharmacists actually 
hindered the local population in its access to contraceptives. 
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conscience,30 some Catholics remain concerned that church members 
may take this to the extreme extent of effectively supplanting the 
legislature with their own convictions while attempting to impose 
those beliefs on other people. 
III. DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE 
PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE 
In 2002, the Catholic Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith issued another statement which describes a broader 
notion of religious norms that Catholics should apply in the political 
realm: The Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the 
Participation of Catholics in Political Life (“Doctrinal Note”).31 It 
was “directed to the Bishops of the Catholic Church and, in a 
particular way, to Catholic politicians and all lay members of the 
faithful called to participate in the political life of democratic 
societies.”32 This Part describes the Doctrinal Note’s conception of 
the Church’s role in the political realm and specifically addresses the 
participation of individual Catholics in the political shaping of an 
“objective moral order.” The focus of the Doctrinal Note is 
somewhat more limited than the broad pronouncements of 
Dignitatis Humanae because it concentrates on the specific issues of 
political engagement and not the broader question of conscientious 
objection. But both inquiries raise questions about the extent to 
which the Church may appropriately seek support for religiously 
grounded norms in the secular legal orders of democratic societies. 
A. It Is Not the Church’s Task To Set Forth Specific Political Solutions 
Because modern politics has become dominated by the theory of 
moral relativism, the Catholic Church defended the limited but 
proper role of religious institutions in the democratic process. After 
recalling the classic teachings of the Council Constitution Gaudium 
et Spes regarding the political freedoms of States,33 the Doctrinal 
Note pointed out the following: 
 
 30. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 11, § 13. 
 31. Doctrinal Note, supra note 12. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 22; see also Dillon, supra note 22. 
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Political freedom is not–and cannot be–based upon the relativistic 
idea that all conceptions of the human person’s good have the same 
value and truth, but rather, on the fact that politics are concerned 
with very concrete realizations of the true human and social good 
in given historical, geographic, economic, technological and 
cultural contexts. From the specificity of the task at hand and the 
variety of circumstances, a plurality of morally acceptable policies 
and solutions arises. It is not the Church’s task to set forth specific 
political solutions—and even less to propose a single solution as the 
acceptable one—to temporal questions that God has left to the free 
and responsible judgment of each person.34 
This statement concedes that when the development of public 
policy involves “a plurality of morally acceptable policies and 
solutions,” specific solutions to temporal questions are generally not 
within the scope of the Church’s legitimate authority.35 Thus, in 
situations where moral principles and religious doctrines do not 
delineate a single correct standard, the Church defers to the 
deliberative democratic process for the development of public policy. 
B. The Catholic Church Has the Right and the Duty To Propose  
a Moral Judgment on Temporal Matters When Required by  
Faith or by Moral Law 
The Doctrinal Note points out, however, that a much different 
rule should apply when religious tenets and their moral application 
do not allow for multiple solutions to a political problem, or exclude 
at least some of the possible options: “It is, however, the Church’s 
right and duty to provide a moral judgment on temporal matters 
when this is required by faith or the moral law.”36 Thus, when 
religious and moral principles necessarily inform the development of 
temporal law, the Church has both the right and the duty to fight 
moral relativism by imparting its religious values in critical public 
policy debates: 
If Christians must “recognize the legitimacy of differing points of 
view about the organization of worldly affairs,” they are also called 
to reject, as injurious to democratic life, a conception of pluralism 
that reflects moral relativism. Democracy must be based on the true 
 
 34. Doctrinal Note, supra note 12, § 3. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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and solid foundation of non-negotiable ethical principles, which are 
the underpinning of life in society.37 
This duty applies not only to the Church as an institution but 
also to individual Catholics. For example, speaking directly of 
legislators, the Church provided a concrete example of applying a 
fundamental religious norm—the sanctity of life—to the political 
process: “Those who are directly involved in lawmaking bodies have 
a ‘grave and clear obligation to oppose’ any law that attacks human 
life. For them, as for every Catholic, it is impossible to promote such 
laws or to vote for them.”38 Thus, according to the Doctrinal Note, 
fundamental religious and moral norms impose a duty on both the 
Church and individual Catholic citizens not only to promote these 
“non-negotiable ethical principles,” but also to fight against those 
proposals that contradict them. 
C. A Conception of Political Autonomy that Distinguishes Religion 
from Morality 
In describing the proper application of religious norms in the 
political process, the Doctrinal Note distinguishes the two spheres of 
morality and religion. For Catholic moral doctrine, “the rightful 
autonomy of the political or civil sphere from that of religion and the 
Church—but not from that of morality—is a value that has been 
attained and recognized by the Catholic Church and belongs to 
inheritance of contemporary civilization.”39 
Within this framework, the Doctrinal Note affirms the pertinence 
of a very narrow concept of “specifically” religious norms: 
All the faithful are well aware that specifically religious activities 
(such as the profession of faith, worship, administration of 
sacraments, theological doctrines, interchange between religious 
authorities and the members of religions) are outside the state’s 
responsibility. The state must not interfere, nor in any way require 
or prohibit these activities, except when it is a question of public 
order.40 
 
 37. Id. (quoting Gaudium et Spes, supra note 22, § 75) (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. § 4 (quoting Pope John Paul II, Evangelum Vitae, § 73 (Mar. 25, 1995) 
[hereinafter Evangelum Vitae], available at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0141/__PS. 
HTM). 
 39. Id. § 6. 
 40. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Thus, building on Pope John Paul II’s declaration that specifically 
religious norms are outside the scope of permissible government 
authority,41 but construing that domain narrowly, the Doctrinal 
Note opens up a broad domain for the application of non-specific 
religious norms (i.e., moral norms) in the political process. 
D. Relationships Between Objective Morality and Political 
Participation of Catholics 
Despite the Doctrinal Note’s support for applying moral norms 
in the political realm, the Church emphasizes that it “does not wish 
to exercise political power or eliminate the freedom of opinion of 
Catholics regarding contingent questions.”42 On the contrary, the 
Church recognizes that “its proper function” is merely “to instruct 
and illuminate the consciences of the faithful, particularly those 
involved in political life, so that their actions may always serve the 
integral promotion of the human person and the common good.”43 
Under this model of teaching and inviting, 
[t]he social doctrine of the Church is not an intrusion into the 
government of individual countries. It is a question of the lay 
Catholic’s duty to be morally coherent, found within one’s 
conscience, which is one and indivisible. “There cannot be two 
parallel lives in their existence: on the one hand, the so-called 
‘spiritual life,’ with its values and demands; and on the other, the 
so-called ‘secular’ life, that is, life in a family, at work, in social 
responsibilities, in the responsibilities of public life and in 
culture . . . .”44 
The Catholic Church responds to the argument that Christians 
should not be allowed to make public policy decisions based on their 
beliefs by reminding citizens of their duty to promote the common 
good and explains that “[p]romoting the common good of society, 
according to one’s conscience, has nothing to do with 
‘confessionalism’ or religious intolerance.”45 The Catholic 
 
 41. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 42. Doctrinal Note, supra note 12, § 6. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (quoting John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation, Christifideles laici, § 59 (Dec. 30, 
1988), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_30121988_christifideles-laici_en.html). 
 45. Id. 
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Constitution Gaudium et Spes defines the “common good” as “the 
sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and 
their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to 
their own fulfillment.”46 Further, the Doctrinal Note explicitly 
criticizes 
[t]hose who, on the basis of respect for individual conscience, 
would view the moral duty of Christians to act according to their 
conscience as something that disqualifies them from political life, 
denying the legitimacy of their political involvement following from 
their convictions about the common good . . . .47 
In the view of the Doctrinal Note, those taking such a view “would 
be guilty of a form of intolerant secularism.”48 
The distinction made by the Catholic Church between political 
and religious spheres is reasonably clear. However, the Church’s 
foundational theory of rights based on an “objective moral order” 
remains more complex and contrasts with a classic liberal position. 
With respect to the first point of view—the distinction between 
politics and religion—the Catholic Church condemns any State 
intrusion in specifically religious matters, but the Church affirms the 
right for Christian citizens to act democratically in order to get a 
majority in favor of a legal system that is consistent with good 
foundational values (as interpreted by the informed conscience of 
each individual). 
On this view, democratically based legal compulsion is 
prohibited only with respect to a narrowly defined understanding of 
specifically religious matters. Such compulsion is not prohibited if it 
involves facially neutral norms, even if these norms are provided or at 
least supported by foundational moral objectivity as interpreted by 
the Church. If the “moral objectivity” adopted by the State is not 
coherent with Catholic doctrine, Catholic citizens have two 
obligations: the first is to attempt to repeal the law through 
democratic processes, and the second is to conscientiously object to 
any participation in the application of the law.49 
Thus, Christian individuals have an obligation to participate 
directly in the political process by advocating policies that are “based 
 
 46. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 22, § 26. 
  47. Doctrinal Note, supra note 12, § 6. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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on the true and solid foundation of non-negotiable ethical 
principles.”50 In exercising this right, the Church recognizes “the 
legitimate plurality of temporal options” and asserts “that lay 
Catholics must assess their participation in political life so as to be 
sure that it is marked by a coherent responsibility for temporal 
reality.”51 Although the definition of “temporal reality” is complex, 
it is clear that “[w]hen political activity comes up against moral 
principles that do not admit of exception, compromise or 
derogation,” Catholics have a duty to protect and defend these 
fundamental moral principles that include protection of life, 
preservation of the family, safeguarding of children, and promotion 
of religious freedom and peace.52 
Yet, how are Christian citizens to perform this function within 
society when many would question the wisdom of their decision “to 
base their contribution to society and political life . . . on their 
particular understanding of the human person and the common 
good?”53 Often, because moral relativism has resulted in “the 
decadence and disintegration of reason and the principles of the 
natural moral law,”54 modern governments have developed policies 
that often contradict “fundamental and inalienable ethical 
demands.”55 Although Dignitatis Humanae seems to suggest that 
Catholics have a right and duty to conscientiously object when this 
occurs, the Doctrinal Note goes further, and by construing the 
notion of specifically religious norms more narrowly, Dignitatis 
Humanae authorizes more active political engagement with respect 
to norms that Catholic citizens view as being grounded in an 
objective moral order. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Catholic approach to incorporating religious norms into 
secular law has embraced at least two possible interpretations of what 
constitutes a religious norm. The first is the broad interpretation 
outlined in Dignitatis Humanae that focuses on conscientious 
 
 50. Doctrinal Note, supra note 12, § 3. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. § 4. 
 53. Id. § 6. 
 54. Id. § 2. 
 55. Id. § 4. 
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objection, suggesting that faithful citizens have a right and duty to 
engage in conscientious objection when the State’s policies 
contradict personal conscience—including conscientious beliefs 
shaped by all religious norms, whether “specifically religious” or not. 
The second, delineated in the Catholic Church’s more recent 
Doctrinal Note and focusing in on the appropriate scope of political 
engagement, relies on a much narrower interpretation of specifically 
religious norms that leaves it open to the political responsibility of 
faithful citizens to use democratic means to collectively impose some 
norms possessing “foundational moral objectivity,” even if they are 
religiously grounded. 
The discrepancy inherent in these two positions requires 
significant clarification. On the one hand, the Church suggests that 
non-specific religious norms can and must be applied in the 
democratic process, which process must ultimately be respected as 
long as the state guarantees religious freedom and refrains from 
interfering in matters of religious choice. On the other hand, the 
Church also suggests that the faithful have an obligation to 
conscientiously object when the State’s policies—which are the result 
of the participatory democratic process—contradict personal beliefs. 
In the future, the main issue for the Roman Catholic Church 
should be to better explain56 how to reconcile these two 
interpretations and how to reconcile relations between the notion of 
“moral objective order,” the prohibition by Dignitatis Humanae of 
any intrusion of the State in religious areas, and a new understanding 
of the consequences of the principle of non-discrimination within a 
pluralist legal system—a principle already affirmed by the Second 
Vatican Council’s Constitution, Gaudium et Spes.57 
 
 
 56. See Ratzinger & Habermas, supra note 7. 
 57. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 22. 
